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Abstract
This Article attempts to provide a practical guide to individuals attempting to determine which
mergers and acquisitions fall under Community jurisdiction. Part I reviews the basic considerations the European Economic Community Regulation No. 4064/89 gives to the term “Community
dimension.” Part II examines the separation of jurisdiction between the Commission of the European Communities and the Member States in light of these two propositions.
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INTRODUCTION
Three central themes run through the European Economic Community Regulation No. 4064/89 (the "Merger Control Regulation" or the "Regulation"):' control according to
competition based criteria, pre-merger notification, and the
application of a single regulatory control to any particular operation. In order that the third of these principles is respected,
the Regulation defines a "concentration with a Community dimension" such that all such concentrations fall within the jurisdiction of the Commission of the European Communities (the
"Commission"); those without a Community dimension do
not. Although there are exceptions to this basic distinction,
these exceptions are of limited importance and are based on
solid economic reasoning. If intelligently applied by the relevant authorities and institutions, they will not result in the exercise of more than one remedy to any given concentration
withit the Community.
The Regulation applies only to concentrations, and not to
structures by which independent undertakings coordinate their
commercial activities. This distinction, which is set out in the
Regulation itself and explained by a Commission notice, is
valid, and takes account of the structure of the competition
rules in the Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (the "EEC Treaty").2 The distinction between the two
t A version of this Article will be published in 1990 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST. (B.

Hawk ed. 1991). Copyright © Transnational Publications, Inc., 1991.
* Official, Commission of the European Communities. All views expressed are
strictly personal to the Author.
1. O.J. L 395/1 (1989), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 2839, corrected version in
O.J. L 257/13 (1990) [hereinafter Merger Control Regulation].
2. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957,
arts. 85-86, 1973 Gr. Brit. T.S. No. 1 (Cmd. 5179-Il), 298 U.N.T.S. 3 (1958) [hereinafter EEC Treaty].

359

360 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LA WJOURNAL [Vol. 14:359
concepts makes economic and legal sense, and it is not difficult
to apply in practice.
This Article seeks to provide a practical guide to individuals attempting to determine which mergers and acquisitions
fall under Community jurisdiction. Part I reviews the basic
considerations the Regulation gives to the term "Community
dimension." Part II examines the separation ofjurisdiction between the Commission and the Member States in light of these
two proposititions.
I. CONCENTRATIONS WITH A COMMUNITY DIMENSION
A. Community Dimension
1. Basic Considerations
The effects of mergers and acquisitions should be the concern of the respective country alone if the effects are limited to
that sole Member State. Irrespective of considerations as to
the proper limits of the secession of sovereignty to supra-national institutions, a national authority will be better placed to
determine the impact of such operations on local markets and
will thus be better able to reach correct regulatory conclusions.
Concentrations which stretch throughout a number of Member
States may be more appropriately dealt with by the Commission, which is in a better position to view the impact of the
operation Community-wide. How is this distinction given effect?
Many solutions can be envisaged that involve market share
tests in differing geographic areas and cross-border trade considerations. Although these solutions have the merit of accurately reflecting this theoretical division, they are difficult to
apply. Nevertheless, many such tests were put forward
throughout the sixteen years of negotiation and redraft that
led to the adoption of the Regulation. During the final series
of negotiations, however, emphasis was placed on the need for
a test that is easily applied. The Council of Ministers of the
European Communities (the "Council") therefore adopted a
three-stage test based on the size of the parties and the geographic split of their activities. Thus, article 1(2) of the Regulation states that
[f]or the purposes of this Regulation, a concentration has a
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community dimension where: (a) the aggregate worldwide
turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than ECU 5,000 million, and (b) the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the
undertakings concerned is more than ECU 250 million, unless each of the undertakings concerned achieves more than
two-thirds of its aggregate Community-wide turnover
within one and the same Member State. 3
The size-related test is based upon the fiction that mergers
and acquisitions by and between large companies are likely to
have a Community-wide effect. Although this is not necessarily
true, it will be correct in the majority of cases, particularly as
the 1992 process results in successful companies expanding
from national to pan-European markets.
Complementing this is the "geographic split of turnover"
test, which enables Member States to retain jurisdiction over
large concentrations, the effects of which are nevertheless
largely confined to that Member State.
The ECU 250 million provision has a dual purpose. First,
it provides a de minimis, excluding operations involving companies or assets of insufficient importance to trigger Community
jurisdiction. Secondly, it acts to determine the extraterritorial
scope of application of the Regulation. By this test, the Community apparently claims jurisdiction over operations which
have significant effects in the Community: 4 any concentration
between two undertakings situated outside the Community
which meet the ECU 5 billion test and which have ECU 250
million turnover in the Community will, subject to the twothirds rule, require notification. 5
The thresholds set for the size-related tests are very high.
As a result, they fail to reflect accurately the theoretically correct division of responsibilities between the Community and
the Member States. Many concentrations falling below the
thresholds will be concluded with the single market process in
3. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 1(2), OJ. L 257/13, at 16.
4. This raises interesting problems in determining the compatibility of this test
with that of "implementation within the Community" as set out by the Court in the
Woodpulp judgement. Woodpulp, O.J. L 85/1 (1985), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH)
10,654.
5. It is submitted that as a consequence of this, a considerable number of mergers and acquisitions centered outside the EEC will fall under Community jurisdiction,
for example, the Sony purchase of Columbia Pictures.
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mind and will have pan-European competitive consequences.
It should be remembered, however, that the thresholds will be
reviewed by the Council by the end of 1993 at the latest. It is
hoped that on that occasion the thresholds will be lowered to
enable the theory to become at least closer to reality.
Commission estimates indicate that approximately eighty
notifications per year may be expected. This figure has been
steadily rising over the previous four years and is expected to
continue increasing with the progress of the 1992 process.
The use of a simple test may upset the purists but will delight
the lawyers, administrators, and businessmen, who agree that
the need for clarity and simplicity outweighs the need for adherence to the theoretical considerations of separation ofjurisdiction.
2. Calculation of Turnover
a. Basic Principles
Article 5(1) of the Regulation describes how "turnover" is
to be defined for the purposes of a Community dimension.'
Aggregate turnover is deemed to include "the amounts derived by the undertakings concerned in the preceding financial
year from the sale of products and the provision of services
falling within the undertakings' ordinary activities after deduction of sales rebates and of value added tax and other taxes
directly related to turnover,"' with intra-group sales being exI
cluded.
The use of the preceding financial year's figures is necessary; otherwise specific amounts would need to be prepared for each notifiable concentration. Although the
occurrence of a substantial acquisition or divestiture
since the closure of the preceding financial year may result in a somewhat artificial picture of the merging companies being presented, this is inevitable. It is also not
problematic when the aim of the thresholds are kept in
mind.
The exclusion of VAT and other taxes directly related to
turnover concerns, inter alia, excise duties.
Pursuant to article 5(4) the turnover of the entire group
6. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 5(1), O.J. L 257/13, at 18.

7. Id.
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to which the undertakings concerned belong must be included in the calculation. The meaning of group in this
context is defined in that article, when read in the light
of the definition of "control" in article 38
b. Exceptions to the Basic Principle
i. Acquisition of Parts
Where one undertaking acquires part of another, and irrespective of whether that part concerns only assets or a whole
company, only the turnover of the acquiring group and that
attributable to the acquired part is considered.9 This exception simply reflects the aim of the turnover test to ascertain the
economic importance of the undertakings concerned. Additionally, in order to prevent "salami tactics" or creeping acquisitions, an operation undertaken by the same group within two
years of a similar approach as the original operation results in
the two operations being combined.
ii. Joint Ventures
If an undertaking is jointly controlled with a non-group
member, only the proportion of the joint venture's turnover
equivalent to the number of undertakings controlling the joint
venture is considered.' ° Sales by the joint venture to the
group are excluded from the calculation.
iii. Concentrative Joint Ventures
If two undertakings transfer all their activities in one product market to a joint undertaking and one or both of them
withdraws entirely from that market, this may constitute a concentration within the meaning of the Regulation. In such
cases, should the turnover of the assets transferred alone be
taken into account, or those of the parent and holding companies as well? Article 5(2) provides no definitive answer." It is
submitted that the turnover of both groups (including that of
the joint venture split amongst the groups) be included in the
8. See id. art. 5(4), 0J. L 257/13, at 18.
9. Id. art. 5(2), OJ. L 257/13, at 18.
10. Id. art. 5(4), OJ. L 257/13, at 18.
11. See id. art. 5(2), O.J. L 257/13, at 18.
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calculation. The test aims to determine the economic importance of parties to the transaction. Because the parents will
have a role to play in the joint venture's future behavior, they
should therefore be included.
iv. Special Rules for Credit Institutions and Insurance
Undertakings
An asset-based test replaces the turnover test in the case
of credit institutions.' 2 The value of premiums is used for in3
surance undertakings.'
B. Concentration
1. Basic Principles
The Regulation defines a concentration on the basis of the
existence of a change of control in the whole or part of an undertaking or undertakings.' 4 It follows from this definition and
that of the term "control" that the Commission examines each
concentration on a case-by-case basis to determine, as a matter
of fact, whether control has passed. The method by which control is acquired is irrelevant; for example, it may be by acquisition of shares, voting rights, the control of assets, seats on the
board of directors, or contract. This definition is a very practical one and will raise no difficulties in ninety-nine percent of
the concentrations.
2. Exceptions to the Basic Principle
Article 3(5) provides that a concentration shall not be
deemed to arise where credit or financial institutions acquire
securities on a temporary basis with a view to reselling them,
and voting rights are not used to determine the competitive
behavior of the undertaking in question.1 5 Voting rights may
be used with a view to preparing the sale of all or part of the
undertaking's securities only if the sale takes place within one
year of the acquisition of the securities, subject to an express
agreement by the Commission granting an extension to this
12.
13.
14.
15.

Id. art. 5(3), O.J. L 257/13, at 18.
Id.
Id. arts. 3(1), (3) & (4), OJ. L 257/13, at 17.
Id. art. 3(5), O.J. L 257/13, at 17.
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period.1 6 Furthermore, article 3(5) in certain circumstances
permits financial holding companies to acquire securities for
investment purposes but to exercise voting rights only to
maintain the full value of the investment and not to determine
the competitive conduct of the undertakings in question. 7
3. The Distinction Between Co-Ordination and
Concentrations: Partial Mergers
a. Introduction
If a cartel-type agreement exists between undertakings occupying thirty percent of a relevant market, antitrust authorities are unlikely to regard the resultant restriction on competition as unimportant. If undertakings with a thirty percent relevant market share between them merge, thus eliminating
competition between them, the operation is likely to be
cleared.
Concentrations resulting in permanent structural market
change are considered to produce benefits not resulting from
commercial cooperation between independent firms, justifying
this differing treatment.'" It is necessary to develop a method
or test to determine which set of rules-merger or cartel-applies to any given operation.' 9 For most operations, this is a
simple task: cartels have none of the characteristics of permanent structural change typical of mergers, and mergers and acquisitions between previously independent firms display few of
the characteristics of cartels.2 0
This distinction is less evident for other types of operations, in particular joint ventures. Ajoint venture can be a cartel: two companies active in the same market set up a joint
16. Id.
17. Id. Article 3(5) also provides that a person acquires control when he is responsible for the winding-up or liquidation of an undertaking. Id.
18. See G6tting & Nikowitz, EEC Merger Control, 13 FORDHAM INT'L LJ. 185
(1989-1990) (distinguishing concentrative joint ventures from cooperative joint ventures).
19. This is true at least under the Community's antitrust rules. The possibility
of different institutions applying the same rules with respect to the same operation,
and of the differing remedies available with respect to the differing rules, renders the
simultaneous application of Articles 85 and 86 or the Merger Control Regulation at
best inadvisable.
20. In the event they do possess the same characteristics, those cartel elements
are usually disassociable from the merger and can be dealt with separately.
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sales agency which fixes the prices of its parents at identical
levels. Ajoint venture can also be a pure merger: two companies devote their entire resources in one market, where their
cooperation in this sector has no effect on the product markets
in which they remain active.
The Commission has always taken the view that in order
to benefit from the more liberal provision, an operation should
fulfill two criteria: (1) it should result in a change on the market of the nature likely to bring the perceived benefits of concentrations, and (2) it should not have the result of restricting
the free market mechanism. It should therefore result in a
long-term or permanent structural change on the market and
should not, directly or indirectly, affect the competitive relationship between the parties.
Prior to the entry into force of the Merger Control Regulation, the Commission applied a partial merger theory to determine which joint ventures were mergers (to be scrutinized
under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty) and which were cooperations between independent companies (falling under Article
85 of the EEC Treaty). It appears that the Commission would
consider a joint venture to be a partial merger 2 1 if two companies created a jointly owned subsidiary and (1) both (or perhaps only one) of the parents completely and irreversibly withdrew from the markets in which the joint venture was active,
and (2) the markets in which the joint venture was active were
sufficiently remote from those on, which the parents remained
to ensure that no anti-competitive spill-over effect occurs on
the parent's conduct due to their cooperation in the joint venture's market. 2
This test has the disadvantage of being difficult to apply,
because the determination of whether or not a company has
completely and irreversibly withdrawn from a market requires
an estimate of the extent to which the parents are actual or
potential competitors of the joint venture. It is nevertheless
logical. The first part of the test determines the concentrative
21. See, e.g., SHV/Chevron, Commission Decision of Dec. 20, 1974, O.J. L 38/14
(1975); De Laval/Stork, Commission Decision ofJuly 25, 1977, O.J. L 215, at
5
(1977); ENI/Montedison, Commission Decision of Dec. 4, 1986, O.J. L 5/13 (1987).
See Banks, Mergers and PartialMergers under EEC Law, in 1987 FORDHAM CORP. L. INST.
373 (B. Hawk ed. 1988).
22. See COMM'N, SixTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY 178 (1976).
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nature of the operation and the permanent nature of the structural change. The second ensures that any spill-over effects
are not sufficiently large to require the operation to be examined under the cartel rules. It is also a strict test, motivated
by the Commission's desire that hidden "cartel type" joint
ventures do not escape the more severe Article 85.
Article 3(2) of the Regulation provides the following test:
An operation, including the creation of a joint venture,
which has as its object or effect the coordination of the competitive behaviour of undertakings which remain independent shall not constitute a concentration .... The creation of
a joint venture performing on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity, which does not
give rise to co-ordination of the competitive behavior of the
parties amongst themselves or between them and the joint
venture, shall constitute a concentration within the meaning
of [the Regulation]. 3
In order to be qualified as a concentration, a joint venture
must therefore fulfill a positive condition (performing on a
lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity) and a negative condition (not giving rise to the coordination of competitive conduct). Just when you thought it was
safe to go into the office the test changed, or has it? Under the
partial merger theory, there was no obligation to prove that
the joint venture could perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity. This is a puzzling
addition, but it appears that it can be explained if one assumes
that the autonomous economic entity test is simply an expression of the requirement that a real structural change on the
market must occur. If a joint venture is created which is not a
separate economic entity from its parents, it is unlikely that the
requisite structural change has occurred. It might be argued
that the adoption of this test is too narrow and does not enable
the Commission to examine, on a case-by-case basis, whether
or not a permanent structural change has in fact taken place.
However, the two concepts are in fact very similar. If a joint
venture is an autonomous economic entity, it will undoubtedly
be the result of permanent structural change. If applied in an
appropriate manner by the Commission, the change in word23. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(2),

OJ. L 257/13,

at 17.
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ing is unlikely to result in any appreciable change from the
"partial merger" test followed under Article 86, and will continue to follow the economic basis behind the distinction. Furthermore, the wording chosen is more readily understandable
by the business community which, in this Author's experience,
is less interested in the finer points of legal analysis than the
legal profession.
The second part of the test, "coordination of the competitive behaviour of the parties amongst themselves or between
them and the joint venture, "24 is more readily understandable.
If the creation of a joint venture produces a permanent structural market change, but nonetheless either serves as a vehicle
for the coordination of the market behavior of the undertakings or has appreciable spill-over effects on their operations
outside of the joint venture, it should be examined under the
cartel provisions, not the merger ones.
The establishment of ajoint venture can have the direct or
indirect effect of coordinating the competitive behavior of the
parents.2 5 If two parents set up a joint venture operating on a
relevant market on which they remain active, this is likely to
have a direct effect on the competitive relationship between
them irrespective of the degree of independence of the joint
venture. If two parents active in the food retailing business set
up a joint venture company to bake bread, this will have an
indirect or "spill-over" effect on the parents' retailing activities.
b. The Notice
On August 14, 1990, the Commission published a notice
(the "Notice") designed "to define as clearly as possible, in the
interests of legal certainty, concentrative and cooperative situations." ' 26 This Notice (1) defines the concept of a joint venture, (2) examines the requirement that the joint venture performs on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous
economic entity, (3) examines the requirement that the opera24. Id.
25. A checklist for determining this in individual cases is set out in CoMM'N,
55 (1984).
THIRTEENTH REPORT ON COMPETITION POLICY
26. OJ. C 203/10 (1990) [hereinafter Notice].
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tion creates no coordination of competitive behavior, and (4)
gives four examples.
1. The Concept of a Joint Venture
To be ajoint venture, the undertaking in question must be
jointly controlled. If it is not, the operation may be a simple
acquisition by the controlling company. If, for example, Company A sells securities in a subsidiary to Company B but that
sale is insufficient to establish joint control, the agreement
must be examined pursuant to Articles 85 and/or 86.27 Joint
control is said to exist where the parent companies agree on
decisions concerning the joint venture's activities. The particular method from which joint control is derived, whether
achieved by shares, voting rights, or contract, is irrelevant.
The Notice states that "[t]here is no joint control where one of
the parent companies can decide alone on the joint venture's
2
commercial activities.11

2. Positive Condition: Joint Venture Performing on a Lasting Basis
All the Functions of an Autonomous Economic Entity
According to the Notice the joint venture must, in order to
fulfill the above-referenced requirement, meet three criteria:
(1) Act as an independent supplier and buyer on the market. As a consequence the joint venture will not be, at least
in the medium/long term, substantially dependent on its
parents for the maintenance and development of its business.
(2) Have the human and material resources to continue in
business independently of its parent companies in the long
run.
(3) Be in a position to exercise its own commercial policy.
This does not mean that the parent companies should not
retain the right to control certain aspects of the company in
order to maintain the value of their investment (e.g., concerning "alterations of the objects of the company, increases or reductions of capital, or the application of prof27. See id.
14 & 15, OJ. C 203/10, at 11; British American Tobacco Co. v.
Commission, Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, 1987 E.C.R. 4487, Common Mkt. Rep.
(CCH)

14,405.

28. Notice, supra note 26,

12, O.J. C 203/10, at 11.
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its") .29
Thus, it appears that the requirement that the joint venture must perform on a lasting basis all the functions of an autonomous economic entity has itself been strictly interpreted.
If the Commission had explicitly interpreted this phrase as an
indication of the fact that a permanent structural change must
result, it would be more easily understandable. The existence
of a real company with assets, not a simple shell, is therefore
necessary. The phrase in the Merger Control Regulation gives
the Commission considerable leeway in determining, on a
case-by-case basis, whether such a structure exists. However,
the requirement that the joint venture exercise its own commercial policy goes much further than this. If, for example,
both parents have completely and irrevocably withdrawn from
the joint venture's market, and the joint venture itself is a permanent structure, it is difficult to see why the economic benefits presumed to mergers would not flow to the joint venture
simply because it received marketing instructions or advice
from one or both of its parents. The argument that the parents would in fact be coordinating their behavior in that market is irrelevant, if there are no spill-over effects on their other
operations; such cooperation is the very essence of a concentration.
The test in the Regulation has thus a certain logic and economic justification, and in the interpretation given to it by the
Commission should be understood in this light. It is therefore
submitted that in each case the Commission must determine
whether an autonomous economic entity (or permanent structural change) exists. In doing so, it must take account of the
factors outlined in the Notice. The factors are indicative, not
determinative.
3. Negative Condition: Absence of Coordination
of Competitive Behavior
Irrespective of the structure of the operation, the central
test under the partial merger theory and the Merger Control
Regulation centers on the competitive relationship between
the parents and the joint venture. 30 If, for example, two tooth29. Id. 19, O.J. C 203/10, at 12.
30. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3(2), O.J. L 257/13, at 17.
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paste manufacturers set up a joint venture and combine their
research and development and sales operations, irrespective of
any economic independence of action of that joint venture,
that collaboration will have a cartel-like effect on the parents'
toothpaste production business. Such an operation should
therefore be examined under the cartel provisions and not the
concentration provisions. If, on the other hand, a steel company and a manufacturer of video-recorders cede their entire
toothpaste business to a joint venture, that is unlikely to affect
their remaining operations and may be examined as a concentration. 3 '
This distinction is explained as follows by the Notice:
There must not be such coordination either between the
parent companies themselves or between any or all of them
on the one hand and the joint venture on the other hand.
Such coordination must not be an object of the establishment or operation of the joint venture, nor may it be the
consequence thereof. The joint venture is not to be regarded as concentrative if as a result of the agreement to set
up the joint venture or as a result of its existence or activities it is reasonably foreseeable that the competitive behavior of a parent of the joint venture on the relevant market
will be influenced. Conversely, there will normally be no foreseeable coordination when all the parent companies withdraw entirely
and permanently from the joint venture's market and do not operate
on markets neighbouring those of the joint venture's.3 2

This definition is entirely logical. If there is neither a direct effect on the competitive relationship of the parents nor
any spill-over between the joint venture's activities and those
of the parents, there is no risk that the concentration will result
in a restriction of competition between the parents in their remaining activities.
31. This example illustrates the difficulty that one would have in understanding
the "independent economic entity" test were it to be interpreted as anything save a
manifestation of the need for permanent structural change, In cases in which "spillover" effects are unlikely, it is normal (but not inevitable) that the resultant company
will be an entire production unit containing all the upstream and downstream operations of its parents in the sector in question. It is in this light that any other interpretation of the autonomy test would reflect not some deeply held conviction that the
economic benefits available to concentrations flow to wholly independent units alone,
but a confusion in the role played by independence of the joint venture in determining spill-over effects.
32. Notice, supra note 26, 20, O.J. C 203/10, at 12 (emphasis added).
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The Notice then continues in paragraph 22 to state that:
In other cases, [those in which the parents are active in the
markets of the joint venture or in neighboring or upstream
or downstream markets] the risk of coordination will be relatively small where the parents limit the influence they exercise to the joint venture's strategic decisions, such as those
concerning the future direction of investment, and when
they express their financial, rather than their market-oriented, interests.3 3
This paragraph appears to indicate that even if there is a
potential spill-over effect due to the proximity of markets in
which the joint venture and its parents operate, ajoint venture
may be considered a concentration if as a matter offact it can act
as an independent competitor of its parents, thus reducing or
eliminating any possible spill-over effects. This is welcomed
because it gives a strong indication that the Commission will
examine each case to determine the competitive relationship
between the parents and the joint venture on the basis of the
facts of each case. 3 4 This indication is strengthened by the
wording of paragraph 23, which states that the "decisive factor
is not the legal form of the relationship between the parent
companies and between them and the joint venture]. The direct or indirect, actual or potential effects of the establishment
and operation of the Uoint venture] on market relationships,
3 5
have determinant importance.1
4. Examples
i. Joint Ventures That Take Over Pre-Existing Activities of
Parent Companies
If all the parent companies transfer all of their assets and
withdraw from any given relevant product and geographic
market, and the nature of the parents' remaining activities produce no likelihood of spill-over effects in both product and geographic terms, the operation is likely to be concentrative.
33. Id. 22, O.J. C 203/10, at 12.
34. It also again highlights the difficulty of the first "independence" test. Ajoint
venture fails the first test if it is not independent from its parents in its marketing
policy. Its independence for the purpose of establishing, as a matter of fact, whether
or not the operation will have spill-over effects loses much, if not all, of its significance.
35. Notice, supra note 26, 23, O.J. C 203/10, at 12.
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To determine whether or not the parents have withdrawn
permanently, the Commission will examine whether they are
actual or potential competitors of the joint venture. The Notice states at paragraph 25 that the following principles will apply: "the notion of potential competition is to be interpreted
realistically . . . [the possibility to enter a market must] be a

realistic option and represent a commercially reasonable
course in the light of all objective circumstances.' '36
If parents continue to compete in the joint venture's product markets but operate only in geographic areas outside the
sphere of influence of the joint venture, the Commission will
examine the degree of difficulty that either party would have in
extending their activities. As barriers to entry are ever decreasing in the Community, it will be increasingly difficult to
convince the Commission that entry into one part of the common market from another is not a realistic possibility.
ii. Joint Ventures that Enter the Parents' Market

Paragraph 33 of the Notice states that
[w]here the parent companies, or one of them, remain active on the joint venture's market or remain potential competitors of the joint venture, a coordination of competitive
behavior between the parent companies or between them
and the joint venture must be presumed. So long as this
presumption is not rebutted, the Commission will take it
that the establishment of the joint venture does not
fall
3 7
under article 3(2), subparagraph 2 of the Regulation.
If both parent companies operate in the joint venture's
market, then it is highly likely that the operation of the joint
venture will directly affect the competitive relationship between the parents. Equally, if only one parent remains fully
active on the joint venture's market, a coordination of competitive conduct may result insofar as the withdrawing parent retains strategic interests in the joint venture's operations. The
suspicion will be that one party has in fact ceded its interests to
the joint venture, but by the retention of its interest in the joint
venture's activities is in fact coordinating its competitive conduct in that market with that of the other parent.
36. Id.
37. Id.

25, O.J. C 203/10, at 13.
33, 0.J. C 203/10, at 14.
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It is thus submitted that the negative presumption is an
expression of the difficulty that companies will face in convincing the Commission that one of them has, as a matter of fact,
withdrawn from the joint venture's market and does not represent a potential competitor, and that the joint venture's operation will not have anti-competitive spill-over effects on the
withdrawing parents' other activities. The withdrawing parent
may, for example, retain activities that use similar technical or
marketing skills to those of the joint venture.
When one of the parents becomes a holding company, exercising its share of the control over the joint venture only to
maximize the value of its investment, or a conglomerate disposes of an activity remote from its other main-stream activities, it should be possible to convince the Commission that despite the presence of one parent company in the joint venture's
market, a concentration occurs. In the case of an industrial
company where only one of a number of associated product
lines or sectors are devoted to the joint venture, this argument
will be far more difficult to prove.
iii. Joint Ventures that Undertake New Activities on Behalf
of the Parent Companies
If a new market entered by the joint venture is one that the
parents would be unable or unlikely to enter alone, and that
market is sufficiently remote from the parents in geographic or
product terms to present a risk of spill-over effects, the joint
venture is likely to be concentrative.
iv. Joint Ventures that Operate in Upstream, Downstream,
or Neighboring Markets
The Commission will examine whether, as a matter of fact,
the joint venture's operation will have an anti-competitive effect on the competitive relationship between the parents.
4. Conclusion
The concentration-cooperation distinction contained in
article 3 of the Regulation3 8 has only one aim: to determine
whether the more severe prohibition test of Article 85 of the
38. Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 3, O.J. L 257/13, at 17.
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EEC Treaty or the more liberal dominant position test of the
Merger Control Regulation applies to any operation.
The success of the test in the Regulation, when read together with the Notice, should be judged according to two criteria:
(1) Does the chosen method of distinction reflect economic reality?
(2) Is the chosen method easy to apply?
This analysis indicates that the ideal test for the purpose
of ensuring that economic theory is reflected in the application
of the concentration-cooperation distinction would be simply
to examine, on a case-by-case basis, (1) the effect of the operation on the competitive relationship between the parents of the
joint venture, and (2) whether or not a permanent structural
change results. If the activities of the joint venture would be
likely to affect the competitive relationship between the parents either on identical, neighboring, upstream or downstream
geographic, or product markets, the operation should be examined under the Article 85 "cartel provision." If it has no
such effects, it would be appropriate to examine the operation
under the Merger Control Regulation. The adoption of such a
flexible case-by-case test, however, makes it very difficult for
undertakings to determine in advance under which set of rules
they will fall. The Regulation thus contains a more specific
two-stage test.
The two-stage test in the Regulation largely reflects the
economic background. At first sight, however, the first part of
this test, the autonomous economic entity, appears to be interpreted in the Notice in a manner difficult to justify on economic grounds. Insofar as this would result in concentrations
which should be considered under the Merger Control Regulation failing under Article 85(1), the jurisdictional test would
become substantive. If this analysis is correct, this would be of
concern as it would result in operations producing economic
benefits not available to cartels being considered-and possibly prohibited-under Article 85(1). The factors listed in the
Notice should therefore be considered as relevant but not necessarily determinative.
For ease of application and clarity, a simple numerical test
similar to that defining the thresholds for the existence of a
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Community dimension but relating to the acquisition of assets
or shares is attractive. Such a simple test would, however, fail
to reflect the economic basis behind the need for the distinction.
Although any test that reflects the economic background
will create difficulties in many cases at least until a substantial
body of precedent is built up, the Regulation and Notice do
give fairly clear guidelines. It has been argued elsewhere that
the Notice will have the effect of increasing uncertainty and
thus raising transaction costs. It is submitted that this is not
true. Irrespective of any doubts as to the extent to which the
Notice reflects economic reality, it sets out clearly which operations will and which will not be considered concentrations. In
such circumstances they are likely to decrease, not raise, transaction costs.
II. SEPARATION OFJURISDICTION BETWEEN THE
COMMISSION AND ITS MEMBER STA TES
A. Basic Principle
The Merger Control Regulation provides that the Regulation alone applies to concentrations with a Community dimension, 9 and that the Commission has exclusive competence,
subject to review by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities (the "Court ofJustice" or the "Court"), to adopt the
decisions provided for in the Regulation.4 ° The Regulation
furthermore mandates that Member States shall not apply
their national legislation on competition to concentrations
with a Community dimension, 4 ' and that Council regulations
implementing Articles 85 and 86 are inapplicable to concentrations with or without a Community dimension.42 Thus, subject
to the exceptions set out below, the Commission alone has
competence to examine concentrations with a Community dimension under its competition rules, and the Member States
have the exclusive competence to examine concentrations
without a Community dimension.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. art. 22(1), OJ. L 257/13, at 24.
Id.
Id. art. 21(2), 0.J. L 257/13, at 24.
Id. art. 22(2), 0.J. L 257/13, at 24.
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B. First Exception: Referral of a Concentration to a Member State
Member States receive a copy of all notifications. They
may also carry out initial inquiries into the operation. According to the Regulation, if a Member State concludes that the
"concentration threatens to create or to strengthen a dominant position as a result of which effective competition would
be significantly impeded on a market, within that Member
State, which presents all the characteristics of a distinct market,
be it a substantial part of the common market or not," it may
request the Commission to refer that concentration to the
competent authority of that Member State.4"
The Commission may pursue one of several courses of action in reply to a request for referral:44 (1) it may concur that a
distinct market and threat to competition exists, and decide to
deal with the case itself to restore effective competition on the
market in question, thus opening proceedings; or (2) it may
concur that a distinct market and threat to competition exists,
and decide that the Member State is in a better position to deal
with the problem than the Commission. In the latter scenario,
the Commission would refer the case back to the Member
State, or (3) it may disagree that a distinct market and/or
threat to competition exists, and adopt a decision refusing to
refer the concentration back and approve the operation. 45 It is

submitted that the existence of such a provision in the Regulation is to be welcomed.
A concentration with a Community dimension will, in certain cases, give rise to purely local problems. An example of
this might be a concentration between two conglomerates that
both have interests in the provision of bus services within a
particular region of one Member State. Such a problem can be
more appropriately dealt with by a national authority with resources better adapted to examining local rather than national
or multi-national markets. Indeed, a Member State would be
more likely to identify such localized problems than the Commission in the first place. The mechanism enabling referral
43. See id. art. 9(1) & 9(3), O.J. L 257/13, at 20. Article 9(7) explains how the
geographical reference market is to be defined by drawing heavily on judgments of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities defining the relevant geographic
market under Article 86. Id. art. 9(7), OJ. L 257/13, at 20.
44. Id. art. 9(3), 0.J. L 257/13, at 20.
45. Id.
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will permit a flexible and appropriate system of control in any
given case, and makes perfect economic and procedural sense.
The main disadvantage of this provision is that in theory it
represents a partial breach of the underlying principle in the
Regulation, that any given operation is subject to only one system of control. If used intelligently by both Member States
and the Commission, however, the breach will be innocuous.
The reasons for this are:
(1) Article 19(2) of the Regulation requires that the
Commission carry out the procedures set out in the Regulation in "close and constant liaison" with the competent authorities of the Member States. 46 As a consequence of this,
if a Member State identifies a threat to competition on a
market of Community significance, it may inform the Commission of this fact at an early stage. The Commission may
then take the necessary action by opening proceedings. In
such circumstances, close and constant liaison would replace the referral provision as a method by which a Member
State may play a significant role at an early stage in the
Commission's decision-making process;
(2) The final decision on
any request for referral re47
mains with the Commission;
(3) For an undertaking it is important that only one authority scrutinize any given operation; it is less important
which authority. It is therefore vital that the use of the referral provision does not result in the Commission examining one aspect of the concentration, the Member State another. The question arises whether the referral of a notified
concentration to a Member State in respect of one local
market problem will preclude the Commission from continuing its examination regarding other markets. For example,
Company A produces concrete and plaster-board. It
merges with Company B, which also produces these two
products. The merged undertaking would have a ninety
percent share of the southern French concrete market, and
an insignificant share of any other concrete market. It
would also hold eighty-five percent of the continental plaster-board market. 48 France requests referral of the concen46. Id. art. 19(2), O.J. L 257/13, at 23.
47. The Commission decision is, however, subject to review by the Court ofJustice of the European Communities.
48. The relevant product and geographic markets used in this example are hypothetical assumptions for the purpose of this example alone.
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tration regarding concrete in France; should the Commission also open proceedings with respect to the plasterboard market?
Article 9 does not expressly address this point, but implicitly indicates that either all of a notified concentration be
referred back to a Member State, or none of it.4 9 Thus, if a
concentration raised local problems in more than one Member State, or if it raised both a local and a Community problem, the Commission would necessarily consider both aspects of the case, and would open proceedings. In any
event, it is likely that the Commission will either refer all or
none of a concentration on policy grounds, irrespective of
any alternative interpretation of article 9 that might militate
in favor of the possibility of a partial referral.
The article 9 provision should therefore be seen not as
creating a system for multiple control, but as a mechanism
for determining which authority is the most appropriate to
deal with any particular case. Undertakings may face two or
more different authorities conducting inquiries at an initial
stage,5 ° but in the light of the detailed information that
must be provided on notification, this will rarely be substantial.
(4) Relevant geographic markets in the Community are
perpetually widening as the principal restrictions to traderegulatory barriers-fall. Local markets the size of a Member State or smaller will become progressively rarer.
Article 9 also contains provisions to ensure that another of
the principles underlying the Regulation-the competitionbased nature of the test to be applied-is respected. Article
9(8) provides that the Member State concerned "may take only
the measures strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective
competition on the market concerned."'" In certain Member
States, a public interest test is applied to concentrations. This
flexible term may include matters not immediately related to a
49. Article 9(1) states that "[t]he Commission may . . . refer a notified concentration." Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 9(1), O.J. L 257/13, at 20
(emphasis added). Article 9(3)(b) states that "it shall refer the case to the competent
authorities." Id. (emphasis added).
50. Inquiries are considered by the Commission prior to the opening of the proceeding, and by the Member State during the three-week period between the date it
receives a copy of the notification and the deadline for the submission of its request
for referral.
51. Id. art. 9(8), O.J. L 257/13, at 20.
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competition analysis, such as employment and industrial and
regional policy. It is difficult to see how the prohibition of a
concentration on such grounds is strictly necessary to safeguard or restore effective competition in the strict sense. However, the Court ofJustice has accepted that matters such as social policy are relevant to Article 85(3) of the EEC Treaty,
which presumably concerns competition.52 In light of this the
Court will probably allow Member States a wide margin of discretion in determining the meaning of competition, and the
measures strictly necessary to safeguard or restore it.
The inclusion of article 9 in the Regulation is therefore
welcomed. Its use as a method of providing a certain flexibility
for determining which authority is best placed to deal with a
concentration is at present limited: any concentration fulfilling
the high thresholds in article 1 is likely to have Communitywide effects. However, if the thresholds are reduced to ECU 2
billion by 1993," it will play a role of greater procedural and
economic significance.
C. Referral of a Concentration Without a Community Dimension to
the Commission
The Commission will acquire jurisdiction to adopt the decisions provided for in the Regulation with respect to concentrations without a Community dimension if the following cumulative requirements are fulfilled:
(1) The concentration creates or strengthens a dominant position as a result of which effective competition is significantly impeded;
(2) A Member State explicitly requests the Commission's intervention;
(3) The restriction of competition occurs in, but need not be
limited to, the territory of that Member State;
(4) The concentration affects trade between Member States;
and
(5) The request is made within one month of the date on
which the concentration was made known to the Member
52. See Metro v. Commission, Case 26/76, 1977 E.C.R. 1875, 29, Common
Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 8435, at 7865.
53. The comments of the Commission on the occasion of the adoption of the
Regulation indicate that it will present a proposal to the Council along these lines
before 1993.
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State or was put into effect.5 4
These requirements were included in the Regulation at
the request of those Member States lacking developed merger
control legislation. They are necessary until the thresholds are
reduced, and will disappear from the Regulation once this reduction occurs.
In the event that such a concentration is referred, the
Commission may "take only the measures strictly necessary to
maintain or restore effective competition within the territory of
the Member State at the request of which it intervenes." 5 In
most cases, this limitation on the Commission's powers of decision will have little or no effect due to the inappropriate nature of remedies other than outright prohibition or approval in
merger control cases.
In the case of trans-border concentrations, this provision
does risk creating a multiple system of regulatory control. One
Member State may decide to deal with the problem itself, another to refer it to the Commission. If the Commission decided to prohibit all or part of the concentration, its decision
would be valid irrespective of a decision by a Member State to
clear the operation. Similarly, a Member State's decision to
prohibit all or part of a concentration would be valid irrespective of a decision by the Commission not to prohibit. This position is not a deviation from the typical position that a Commission decision takes precedence over a conflicting national
one, because the two decisions would aim to remedy a situation in different geographic areas and would not therefore conflict.
Article 9, rather than article 21, creates a real danger of
multiple regulatory control with respect to a single concentration. Close and constant liaison between the Commission and
the Member States hopefully will reduce such occurrences to
the unavoidable minimum, and the coordination of their action
will reduce the consequent costs, in monetary and management time, as much as possible.
D. Protection of the Legitimate Interests of the Member States
Article 21 permits Member States to "take appropriate
54. See Merger Control Regulation, supra note 1, art. 22(3), O.J. L 257/13, at 24.
55. Id. art. 22(5), Oj. L 257/13, at 24.
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measures to protect legitimate interests other than those taken
into consideration by this Regulation and compatible with the
56
general principles and other provisions of Community law."
It expressly states that legitimate interests include "[p]ublic security, plurality of the media and prudential rules." 5 7 Before
these interests are considered legitimate, however, the Member State must ask the Commission to recognize them as such.
The Commission's decision on the legitimacy of such interests
must be based on an assessment of their compatibility with
Community law.
The effect of article 21 is to partially reverse the normal
supremacy principle that a Commission decision or Court
judgment in the competition field takes precedence over a conflicting national one. It does not therefore prevent the Commission from adopting any measures provided for in the Regulation in the case of concentration in the armaments or media
sectors. It would, however, permit Member States to take a
contrary view to that of the Commission on grounds unrelated
to competition, which would have precedence. For example,
the Commission might find the purchase of a Spanish news
agency or weapons manufacturer by a South American company compatible with the competition-based test of the Regulation. The Member State may, however, validly prohibit its
completion on other legitimate interest grounds.
A statement by the Commission upon the adoption of the
Regulation explains that:
(1) the provision recognizes the existing reserved powers
of the Member states to intervene on grounds other that
those covered by the Regulation. Competition related considerations cannot therefore be legitimate interests.
(2) The clause only enables Member States to prohibit a
concentration or make it subject to additional conditions
and requirements. It does not enable them to authorize a
concentration prohibited by the Commission.
(3) Prohibitions or restrictions placed on concentrations
may constitute neither a form of arbitrary discrimination
nor a disguised restriction on trade between Member
States.
.(4) Measures will only be compatible with Community law
56. Id. art. 21(3), O.J. L 257/13, at 24.
57. Id.
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if they are based on the principles of necessity or efficacy
and proportionality. The measures taken must therefore be
limited to the minimum necessary to ensure the protection
of the legitimate interest in question. Where alternatives
exist, the least restrictive measure available to achieve the
end pursued must be selected.
(5) The term public security is wider than defence interests.
Irrespective of the existence of article 21, a Member State
may intervene in respect to a concentration that would be
contrary to the essential interests of its security and is connected to the production and sale of armaments pursuant to
Article 223 of the EEC Treaty. The wider meaning of public security could, for example, cover the need to maintain
supplies of strategic materials or other materials necessary
for the public good.
(6) Prudential rules relate in particular to financial services
and are normally entrusted to national bodies regulating financial markets. They might permit the prohibition of a
concentration on the grounds that the acquiring undertaking fails to meet minimum standards regarding the good repute of individuals and solvency requirements.
Although the results of the application of article 21 may
result in more than one authority examining a concentration, it
does not breach the basic single regulatory control principle.
The important point is that any single concentration is examined by a sole competition authority. In all jurisdictions a
different number of rules apply to control concentrations, and
may be enforced by differing bodies. Their application and implementation requires differing expertise and criteria. Stock
exchanges and national banks may, for example, have authority to decide on solvency questions. The Merger Control Regulation provides a system no different to that of such national
jurisdictions in this respect.
E. The Application of Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC Treaty
The dis-application of the regulations providing a procedural framework for the Commission's implementation of Articles 85 and 86 to concentrations renders the Commission effectively powerless to apply the EEC Treaty's competition
rules to concentrations with or without a Community dimen-
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sion. 51
On the occasion of the adoption of the Regulation, the
Commission reserved the right to take action pursuant to Article 89, but stated that it did not intend to take action in respect
to concentrations with a worldwide turnover of less than ECU
2 billion and a Community turnover level of ECU 100 million.
Article 89 was intended to provide an interim method to enable the Commission to apply Articles 85 and 86 during the
short period between the entry into force of the EEC Treaty
and the adoption of detailed procedural implementing rules by
the Council. They establish a procedure wholly inappropriate
to merger control cases.5 9 The procedural drawbacks may ultimately so outweigh any gains in applying Article 86 to concentrations with or without a Community dimension that the
Commission will rarely, if ever, have recourse to Article 89.
Article 86 is, however, directly applicable to national
courts even in the absence of Council implementing measures.' The Commission has stated that it will not normally
intervene via Article 89 in cases where the undertakings concerned have a turnover of less than ECU 2 billion/100 million
because a concentration would not normally affect trade between Member States at such levels. Below these thresholds, a
national court may well decline a request for the application of
Article 86 to a concentration on these grounds. Above the de
minimis threshold, however, it appears difficult to argue that
Article 86 would be somehow inapplicable to concentrations.
The Commission's explicit desire for a reduction of the thresholds to the de minimis level indicates its view that concentrations
in this area are likely to affect trade appreciably. It thus appears that, at least with respect to concentrations between
ECU 2 billion and ECU 5 billion, a challenge to an operation in
a national court under Article 86 has a reasonable chance of
success.
58. Id. art. 22(2), Oj. L 257/13, at 24.
59. If the Commission finds an infringement, it issues a recommendation, proposing appropriate measures to bring it to an end. If the infringement is not brought
to an end, the Commission issues a reasoned decision. The Commission may then
authorize Member States to take the measures, the conditions and details of which it
shall determine, needed to remedy the situation.
60. See Ahmed Saeed v. Zentrale, Case 66/86, 1987 E.C.R. 3801, Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) [1989] 2 CEC 654.
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This interim position will be remedied once the thresholds
have been lowered. Article 86 will then be effectively inapplicable regarding concentrations. If the Commission is charged
with deciding whether a concentration creates or strengthens a
dominant position under the Merger Control Regulation, it is
unlikely that a national court will come to a view contrary to
that of the Commission by applying Article 86. The problem
of the applicability of Article 86 to concentrations below the
lowered thresholds will remain, but if the Court of Justice confirms the Commission's position on the absence of an appreciable effect on trade between Member States for such operations, this "infant disease" will be all but remedied.
CONCLUSION
This Article set out to justify the following two statements:
(1) The exceptions to the "one-stop shop" are of limited
importance and based on solid economic reasoning. Furthermore, if intelligently applied by the relevant authorities
and institutions, they will not result in the exercise of more
than one remedy to any given concentration within the
Community.
(2) The Regulation applies only to concentrations, not
structures by which independent undertakings co-ordinate
their commercial activities. This distinction is valid, taking
account of the structure of the competition rules in the EEC
Treaty. The test applied to distinguish between the two
concepts makes economic and legal sense. The distinction
is not difficult to apply in practice.
It failed. Partially.
Firstly, the idea that the "one-stop shop" principle is subject to only very limited exceptions that do not create multiple
regulatory control with respect to any particular operation but
serve only to determine which authority is responsible for any
case-is flawed because: (1) the referral of a concentration without a Community dimension to the Commission by a Member
State risks the consequence of multiple control; (2) Article 86
may be applied by a national court to a concentration without a
Community dimension which is also being examined by a national competition authority; and (3) the existence of the legitimate interest provision.
However, such over-lapping will occur very rarely. The
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first exception is likely to disappear once the thresholds have
been lowered, as it is hoped, will the second. The third is an
unavoidable consequence of the lack of political integration in
the Community but may become progressively less important
if the Community becomes a more political union than it is
presently.
Secondly, the test in the Regulation to delineate between
coordination and concentration is necessary in the light of the
different procedures and remedies under Articles 85 and 86
and the Merger Regulation, and makes economic sense. However, if the Notice were to be seen as-giving a severe interpretation of the "autonomous economic entity" test contained in
the Regulation it would be more difficult to equate with the
economic background, and would risk creating a substantive
test in itself.
The factors listed in the Notice should therefore be considered as points to take into account in determining whether
or not, in any particular case, an autonomous economic entity
(or a permanent structural change) exists, and should not be
considered to be a further, additional test, to that of autonomy.
When examined in the light of alternatives, the use of a
strict test with detailed guidelines is as clear as could be hoped
for. Nevertheless, the distinction will be difficult to apply in
practice, not due to a fault in the provisions of the Regulation
or the Notice, but to the inherent difficulty of determining
whether, as a question of fact, any given operation will affect
the competitive relationship between the parents.

